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The Niesig and NLRA Union

Currently, few cases actually proceed to trial, despite the reality that more
complaints are filed than ever before.1 The catch is that many cases are tried in
discovery.2 Attorneys use various methods of formal discovery to strengthen their
cases while weakening their opponents. They may even use discovery motions to
create the appearance of winning in an effort to increase leverage. Because attorneys
are skilled in evaluating evidence, at the close of discovery, they can often effectively
calculate the probable outcome of a trial. The perceived winner of discovery might
either leverage a greater settlement or successfully move for summary judgment. In
such a litigation climate, methods of informal discovery take on ever greater
significance.
Ex parte interviews are a particularly effective method of informal discovery, in
actions against entities especially, not least because they comport well with state and
federal policies of liberal discovery. 3 An ex parte interview is where an attorney
questions an individual outside the presence of opposing counsel. Such interviews
help streamline the collection of the facts.4 Witnesses are more likely to be less
guarded and provide relevant information at informal interviews than at formal
depositions.5 In such a setting, attorneys are better able to discern which witnesses
have relevant information to their theory, a streamlining with cost-cutting benefit.6
Ex parte interviews also help level the playing field, which is especially valuable in

1.

See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255,
1255 (2005).

2.

James W. McElhaney, Discovery is the Trial: Use Depositions as if They’re the Only Chance You’ll Have to
Try the Case, 93 A.B.A. 26, 26 (2007) (“In more than 90 percent of all cases filed in the United States,
discovery is the only trial anybody gets.”).

3.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101 (McKinney 2009); Spectrum Sys. Int’l. Corp. v.
Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 376 (1991) (section 3101 “embodies the policy determination that
liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits.”); Doe v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “have never been thought to
preclude the use of such venerable, if informal, discovery techniques as the ex parte interview.”).

4.

In Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 377 (1990), Judge Bellacosa stated, “[d]iscovery of the truth and
relevant proofs is the end to which litigation is the means. The fewer the parties to whom counsel can
informally turn in the quest for facts on behalf of a client’s cause, the more cumbersome becomes the
realization of this goal.”

5.

See Stephen Sinaiko, Ex Parte Communication and The Corporate Adversary: A New Approach, 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1456, 1477–79 (1991) (“[F]ormal discovery is not an ideal—or even adequate—substitute for the
informal interview.”); G-1 Holdings v. Baron & Budd, 199 F.R.D. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Indeed,
ex parte interviews with such persons have been recognized as having an important role in information
gathering in that former employees ‘often have emotional or economic ties to their former employer and
would sometimes be reluctant to come forward with potentially damaging information if they could
only do so in the present of the corporations attorney.’”) (quoting Polycast Tech. Corp.v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
129 F.R.D. 621, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1975) (“[I]nterviews in the presence of opposing counsel did not lend themselves to the free and open
discussion which IBM sought.”).

6.

Int’l Bus. Mach. Corps.,526 F.2d at 41 (“A lawyer talks to a witness to ascertain what, if any, information
the witness may have relevant to his theory of the case.”).
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employment and civil rights cases.7 Entities, whether commercial or governmental,
normally have greater evidentiary advantages than individual plaintiffs because they
have immediate access to documents and employee-witnesses, while plaintiffs
typically lack such resources.8 Finally, ex parte interviews promote the ideals of justice
because costly depositions may actually deter plaintiffs with limited means from
pursing legal remedies.9
However, New York Professional Code of Conduct Rule 4.2 (Rule 4.2), which had
previously been Disciplinary Rule 7-104 prior to 2009 and is in informally known as the
“no-contact rule,” curtails ex parte interviews by prohibiting an attorney from
communicating with a “party” who is represented by counsel.10 The rule is easily applied
when a party is a person, but because entities operate through employees, it is unclear
which employees constitute the “party.” For decades the New York State courts never
addressed the problem of when an employee is a “party,” and the New York bar associations
that took aim at it devised an array of conflicting tests. Finally, in 1990, the New York
Court of Appeals seemingly resolved the issue in Niesig v. Team I by promulgating a
three-prong “alter-ego test.”11 Under this test, a party includes “corporate employees
whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in
effect, the corporation’s ‘alter egos’) or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its
liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel.”12 Since then, both courts and
commentators have primarily addressed whether or not low-level and former employees
should be considered parties under the test, typically concluding that they are not.13
7.

Kaveney v. Murphy, 97 F.Supp.2d 88, 94 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Employment cases, especially discrimination
claims, present the most compelling case for court authorization of ex parte contact between the
plaintiff ’s counsel and the defendant’s employees.”).

8.

See e.g., Siguel v. Trs. of Tufts College, No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990)
(“[Defendant] controls access to nearly all the information and evidence [plaintiff] needs to present his
[discrimination] case.”); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 568 (Wash. 1984) (“[T]here is
the need of the adverse attorney for information which may be in the exclusive possession of the
corporation and may be too expensive or impractical to collect through formal discovery.”).

9.

See Bouge v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D. Utah 1990) (“[I]t must be recognized that
contemporary litigation is costly and often the ‘little guy’ . . . is at a distinct disadvantage in the process.”).

10.

N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200 (2009); N.Y. Comp. Codes & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.33
(1990).

11.

See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363 (1990).

12.

Id.

13.

See, e.g., George B. Wyeth, Talking to the Other Side’s Employee’s and Ex-Employees, 4 Litig. 8–11 (1989)
(former and low-level employees); Susan J. Becker, Conducting Informal Discovery of a Party’s Former
Employees: Legal and Ethical Concerns and Constraints, 51 Md. L. Rev. 239 (1992); Robert S. Whitman,
Ex Parte Contacts with an Adversary’s Former Employees, 237 NY.L.J. 4 (2007); John E. Iole & John D.
Goetz, Ethics or Procedure? A Discovery-Based Approach to Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees of a
Corporate Adversary, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 81 (1992) (former employees); Walter Lucas, ABA Ethics
Unit Approves Ex-Employees Interviews, 127 N.J.L.J. 1067 (1991); Marshall Lasser, An Attorney’s Right to
Interview Ex Parte Employees of a Corporate Adversary, 74 Mich. B. J. 166 (1995); C. Evan Stewart,
Ground Rules Shift for Ex Parte Interviews, 13 Nat’l L. J. S6 (1991); Heidi L. McNeil & Sara R.
Roberson, Ex Parte Communications with Former Employees of an Adversary: When are they Permitted?,
Ariz. Att’y, Jan. 1996, at 19; Katt v. New York City Police Dep’t, No. 95 Civ. 8283, 1997 WL 394593,
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Surprisingly, the issue that remains largely unexamined is which higher-level
employee witnesses are reachable for ex parte interviews—since Niesig did not
completely ban such interviews. This inquiry is not easily resolved. The Niesig test
fails to demarcate where the boundary-line rests along the organizational hierarchy
beyond which attorneys may not pass.14 Rather, the three-pronged test leaves
attorneys, who wish both to zealously advocate for their clients and remain within
the ethical lines, with an interpretive puzzle because the test is premised on general
and open-ended principles of agency and evidence law that are unsuitable in the
attorney disciplinary context. Deferring to agency and evidence law forces attorneys
to probe into and verify the employee’s status before conducting ex parte interviews—an
arduous and inexact operation.
Much of the time, attorneys will actually request permission from the employer
directly or from the court to conduct such interviews. This situation becomes problematic
when an employer objects to an attorney’s request or judicial application to interview
employees ex parte on the grounds that the employees are supervisors or managers. With
such a representation from the employer, the employees are presumably off-limits under
the Niesig test. Consequently, the attorney may abandon the discovery option, or a court
may summarily hold that the employee’s title satisfies the Niesig test.
Yet claiming that an employee is a supervisor or manager should not automatically
render the employee a “party”—on the face of it, Niesig does not authorize so broad an
interpretation. The effect would be inequitable. Consider, for example, a company that
employs over 100,000 employees with varying supervisory and managerial levels. The
company could use the disciplinary rule offensively to insulate its workforce from ex
parte interviews solely based on titles,15 many of which might be simply decorative rather
than an actual anointment of authority.16 Such a result would grant companies exclusive
ownership and control over witnesses, a consequence that, as the Second Circuit has
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1997) (low-level); Pritchard v. County of Erie, No. 04 Civ. 00534, 2007 WL
1703832, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 2007) (low-level); Albany Med. Ctr. v. U.S., 04 Civ. 1399, 2006 WL
4573714 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2006) (former employee); Wright v. Stern, No. 01 Civ. 4437, 2003 WL
23095571, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2003); Pauling v. Sec‘y of the Dep’t of Interior, No 95 Civ. 8408,
1997 WL 661393, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (low-level employee); Wright, 2003 WL 23095571 at
*1 (same); Gidatex v. Campaniello Imps., Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (low-level
employees); Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 506, 509 (2007) (former employee); Polycast
Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 WL 180571, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990)
(same); Judd v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc, No. 07 Civ. 7932, 2008 WL 906076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 3, 2008) (same); Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, LLP, No. 03 Civ. 5560,
2006 WL 1520227, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) (former employees).
14.

See Wright, 2003 WL 23095571, at *1; Burns v. Bank of Am., No. 03 Civ. 1685, 2007 WL 1589437, at
*14, n.12 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (“[W]hether [the] communications [with an individual] who is
certainly in a managerial position . . . would be allowed under Niesig is less clear but need not be decided
for the purposes of the present motion.”).

15.

See Frey v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (a blanket ban would
“permit [defendant] to barricade huge numbers of potential witnesses from interviews except through
costly discovery procedures”).

16.

One district court has noted, “[d]etermining what employees are managerial, however, can be difficult,
especially as industry increasingly recognizes the efficiency advantages in many instances of delegation
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made clear, is incompatible with “time-honored and decision-honored principles . . . that
counsel for all parties have a right to interview an adverse party’s witnesses (the witness
willing) in private, without the presence or consent of opposing counsel.”17
While each prong of the alter-ego test suffers from its own infirmities, when an
attorney seeks to interview an employee fact witness, the main prong of the test used
is whether the employee is able to “bind” the company.18 In its current state, the
binding prong does not effectively help attorneys identify which managerial or
supervisory witnesses are parties. The bases for the binding prong—agency and
evidence law—are uninformative and raise more questions than they answer.19 An
effective disciplinary rule should be composed in a manner that provides clear
guidance; such is fundamental for regulating attorney conduct. If a rule requires
judicial clarification, the resultant test should then provide clear guidance. Rule 4.2
is unreasonably vague in relation to organizational parties, and its judicially-created
companion Niesig test fails to fill in the gaps, a deficiency which invites a broad and
inconsistent range of consequences.
	Aggressive attorneys who attempt their own interpretation of the binding prong
and conduct ex parte interviews risk disciplinary sanctions. This threat may also
induce less aggressive attorneys to forsake the method altogether, potentially losing
access to valuable information and forcing them to resort to more expensive and
cumbersome formal methods. Or attorneys may seek wasteful discovery on the
ancillary issue of an employee’s authority, unnecessarily prolonging and burdening
the litigation. 20 Finally, the binding prong does not promote judicial efficiency
because it inevitably requires courts to determine whether or not an employee should
be designated a party. In so doing, attorneys reveal their legal strategy, which
undermines the purpose of the informal interview.
	Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals should further explain the term
“binding.” Stated differently, the prong requires a practical instrumental basis to make
it more operational. Agency and evidence law alone are inadequate. This Article argues
that the National Labor Relations Act’s “supervisor” test will provide a better basis for
the binding prong because it will establish a clearer bright-line standard to determine
when employee fact witnesses, high-level ones in particular, are able to bind the
employer. The NLRA supervisor test comports well with the current jurisprudential
bases of the Niesig test and will improve the functionality of the binding prong.
of decisionmaking authority to the working level.” Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441,
443 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
17.

Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975).

18.

For the purposes of this Article, fact witness employees are those that do not expose the entity to
vicarious liability (imputation prong) or associate with counsel (counsel prong). They are the bystanders
who see the events that have given rise to a cause of action.

19.

See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 373–75 (1990).

20. See Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 377 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (The test may “replace a useful and straightforward ex

parte interview with a whole new and expensive litigation tier. . . . [T]he purpose of pretrial discovery—or
the ultimate litigation question itself—may well be which employees fit into the protected ‘party’ category.”).

265

The Niesig and NLRA Union

Part I provides a historical overview of American ethical oversight, highlighting
the change in oversight from broad standards to regulatory commands and the effect
of that evolution on the goals of oversight. Part II specifically focuses on the history
of the no-contact rule prior to Niesig. While the rule itself has undergone minimal
changes since it first appeared in the nineteenth century, both New York bar
associations and courts have struggled to clarify the meaning of “party” in the
organizational arena, devising numerous tests.
Part III examines the appropriate composition of disciplinary rules as opposed to
standards or aspirational commands. When an ethical directive subjects attorneys to
punitive sanctions, it must provide clear, prospective guidance. If the directive leaves
attorneys guessing or unsure, it fails. Part IV discusses the shortcomings of Niesig,
focusing on how the doctrines of agency and evidence are inadequate bases to assist
attorneys in determining when high-level employees are able to bind their employer.
Part V outlines the basic concepts of the NLRA supervisor test. By explicitly defining
a supervisor, the test helps articulate a hierarchal boundary beyond which attorneys
may not pass.
Finally, Part VI outlines procedural and evidentiary requirements that parties should
satisfy either to conduct or preclude ex parte interviews, taking into account the purposes
of the rule and the interests of all parties. Currently, no uniform procedure is used.
Instead, both sides have pursued an array of measures in an effort to protect themselves.
I.

A Brief History of American Legal Ethical Oversight

The development of American legal ethical oversight has become a familiar
history.21 Ethical oversight grew out of a movement to restore and ensure the integrity,
stature, and public trust of the legal profession. To reestablish the profession’s honor,
legal ethicists pressed classical republican values, which promoted a greater balance
between the interests of the social polity and the client. At the same time, the focus
of legal ethics has shifted from generalized moral standards toward particularized
regulations. These two divergent social standards have often collided with one
another. The more regulated the system has become, the more it has progressively
diminished the traditional moral characteristics, prized by a profession selfproclaimed as guardians of the law. This gradual sea change has garnered a great
deal of scholarly debate over whether narrow, legalistic commands or general,
instructive propositions better serve the profession and the law. 22
21.

See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 53–63 (West Publishing Co. 1986); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L. J. 1239, 1249–53 (1991); James M. Altman,
Considering the A.B.A’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2395 (2003); Andrew M. Perlman,
Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 977, 999–1009 (2003); Allison
Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 Ala. L.
Rev. 471 (1998); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding
the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 1117, 1125–45 (1999).

22.

Compare Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80
Iowa L. Rev. 901, 910 (1995) (a “code of positive law cannot serve this prefatory function by placing
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A. The Professional Temperament in the Early 20th Century

During the early twentieth century, the legal profession was still recovering from a
dramatic decline in public perception. In his 1953 history, The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, Roscoe Pound described the era from the 1830s to 1870s as an “Era of
Decadence,” characterized by rapid deprofessionalization. 23 The profession lacked
uniform and rigorous standards and requirements for education, bar admission, and
practice.24 Many states had, in fact, eliminated educational requirements, while other
states substantially reduced them. In some instances, courts were legislatively restricted
from reviewing and nullifying relaxed admissions policies.25 While Jeffersonian and
Jacksonian democratic ideals effectively loosened the aristocratic grip over the profession,
they also left it without a national institutional infrastructure and the standards and
traditions such institutionalism might otherwise foster.26 Nearly any individual was
admitted to practice, regardless of professional or educational aptitude or level of formal
education. As a result of this de-institutionalization, “the bar was not,” Pound observed,
“to be regarded as a profession, but as a mere private, money-making occupation,”
reducing the vocation into a trade.27 In addition, with licenses granted indiscriminately,
unethical and unprofessionalized attorneys could easily prey on the socially vulnerable,
further injuring the profession’s reputation.28 Beginning in the 1870s, states gradually
began devising ethical codes, improving educational standards, and toughening bar
admission requirements.29 Local and state bar associations also began to emerge, with the
express mandate to fortify the profession’s stature.30
Despite late nineteenth-century advances, the profession remained largely
unchanged and vulnerable at the turn of the century,31 particularly in a national climate
of expanding capital and corporate growth. Many in the profession had allied themselves
with wealthy, corporate interests, helping them circumvent or invalidate restrictive
economic legislation and defeat social litigation. Many attorneys subordinated civic
ethics outside the sphere of law. Such a positivist misplacement of ethics will prevent lawyers from
being guided by ‘conscience,’ thereby stif ling ethics.”) with Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity
Thesis, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 551 (1991) (attorneys may act with integrity within a positivist ethical system).
23.

Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times 221 (1953).

24.

See id. at 227–29.

25.

See id. at 230.

26. See id. at 234–37; see also Harlan F. Stone, Law and its Administration 172 (1915).
27.

Pound, supra note 23, at 232; see also Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law
1780–1860 253 (1977) (“Law, once conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic and, above all, a
paramount expression of the moral sense of the community, had come to be thought of as a facilitative of
individual desires and as simply reflective of the existing organization of economic and political power.”).

28. Stone, supra note 26, at 170.
29. Pound, supra note 23, at 253–85.
30. See Pound, supra note 23, at 253–78.
31.

Pound noted that “[t]he harm which this deprofessionalizing of the practice of law did to the law, to legal
procedures, to the ethics of practice and to forensic conduct has outlived the era.” Pound, supra note 23.

267

The Niesig and NLRA Union

and social interests to their own and to those of wealthy clients. In a 1905 address at
Harvard, Louis Brandeis lamented that lawyers had “allowed themselves to become
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their powers for
the protection of the people.”32 Brandeis worried that the profession’s ability to help
“capitalists” overcome welfare regulations would accelerate and amplify economic
disparity, igniting social unrest.33 That same year also in an address at Harvard,
President Theodore Roosevelt scorned: “[T]he great lawyer who employs his talent
and his learning in the highly remunerative task of enabling a very wealthy client to
override or circumvent the law is doing all that in him lies to encourage the growth in
this county of a spirit of dumb anger against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy.”34
Roosevelt called on the profession to act as bulwarks against monied interests who
were a “menace to our community.”35 Later, Harlan F. Stone reflected: “The tremendous
economic changes which took place in this country . . . exercised a powerful influence
on the bar” giving “us a new type of lawyer . . . who, at his worst, is the mere hired man
of corporations.”36 Stone blamed the deterioration of the bar on the “loss of community
interest and loss of pride of professional caste in the legal profession.”37
In speeches before bar associations and graduating law school classes, a number
of less prominent figures echoed the sentiments of national leaders regarding the
ethical condition and direction of the profession. In a 1902 address before John
Marshall Law School, Judge James Jenkins of the Seventh Circuit advised students
against “sharp practice” and “trickery,” urging them not to make monetary wealth
their sole aim because it “begets avarice or indolence, and either endangers the lawyer,
dulling the eye of appreciation for the lofty principles of action which the law
inculcates, stupefying zeal in its pursuits.”38 In order to harmonize the relationship
between the profession and community, an attorney before the New York State Bar
Association (NYSBA) in 1904 argued for the need to remove “speculative actions,”
“chicanery,” and “ambulance-chasing” from the profession.39 That same year, speaking
32.

Louis D. Brandeis, An Exhortation to Organized Labor (Feb. 5, 1905), in Business, A Profession,
321 (Small, Maynard & Co. 1914).

33.

Id. at 323 (“The immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility from which much trouble
will come to us unless the excesses of capital are curbed . . . There will come a revolt of the people
against the capitalists unless the aspirations of the people are given some adequate legal expression; and
to this end cooperation of the abler lawyers is essential.”).

34. Theodore Roosevelt, Harvard Commencement Address, The Harvard Spirit (June 28, 1905), in The

Harv. Gr aduates’ Mag., Sept. 1905, at 8, available at w w w.archive.org/stream/
presidentialadd16roosrich/presidentialadd16roosrich_djvu.txt.

35.

Id. at 7.

36. Stone, supra note 26, at 176.
37.

Id. at 166.

38. James G. Jenkins, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Address before

the Graduating Class of John Marshall Law School 7, 9–10 (June 16, 1902).

39.

Edward P. White, Address before the New York State Bar Association, Changed Conditions in the
Practice of Law 10 (Jan. 19, 1904).
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before the Allegheny County Bar Association, another attorney stressed the need for
professional independence from special, monied interests.40 In 1905, Judge Irving Vann
of the New York Court of Appeals warned the graduating class of Albany Law School
that “[t]he commercial spirit, which, to an alarming extent, has invaded the bar, is the
cause of many abuses, and among the most serious is the setting on of lawsuits for the
simple purpose of making money.”41 He stressed that success was not “measured by
money” but must “embrace something more,” which he defined as being aids in the
“administration of justice.”42 Later that year, in an address before the American Bar
Association, an attorney noted that there was no room in the profession for “the purely
mercenary” attorneys “who view the calling as a trade, as merely the means of gaining
a livelihood.”43 This small sampling captures the profession’s state of disaffection and
greed at the turn of the twentieth century, even as it demonstrates the ethos of reform
through appeals to reconnect the profession to a higher-purpose.
B. The Canons of Professional Ethics

For its part, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1908, which contained thirty-two standards of conduct.44 The
Canons were hortatory and moralistic in tone and scope, largely leaving attorneys to
consult their own judgment. According to the legal historian Geoffrey Hazard, the
Canons were not binding tenets, but “were used primarily as guides to the ethical
duties of lawyers and as standards of professionalism.”45 While not originally intended
to possess “the force and effect of statutes,” over time, the Canons became “recognized
by the Bench and Bar as establishing wholesome standards for professional conduct,”
which courts enforced or used as guidance in attorney disciplinary proceedings.46
The Code’s rhetoric promoted an ideology grounded in classical republican values
of citizenship—in this instance, the citizen-attorney’s duty to the social polity. As
40. David Thompson Watson, Address at the Allegheny County Bar Association Annual Dinner, The

Profession 3–4 (Feb. 12, 1904) (“Our influence is of great importance in preventing rash and unwise
legislation . . . in restraining the improper use of great power for mere selfish and material end. But to
do this . . . the Bar must be united and independent and, above all else, be solely a profession, be
composed of professional men who are apart from trade and commerce . . . . Never be owned by any
corporations, or any man, or any interest.”).

41.

Irving G. Vann, Address at the Commencement of Albany Law School (May 31, 1905), in Irving G.
Vann, Contingent Fees: Address in Hubbard Course on Legal Ethics: Delivered at the
Commencement of Albany Law School 4 (1905).

42.

Id. at 2.

43.

Lucien Hugh Alexander, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass’n (Aug. 23, 1905), in
Lucien Hugh Alexander, Some Requirements for Admission to the Bar Considered Apart
from Educational Standards 1 (1905).

44. Code of Prof’l Ethics (1908).
45.

Hazard, supra note 21, at 1239, n.77.

46. In re Connelly, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126, 130 (1st Dep’t 1963); see also In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 487 (Mass.

1928); Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 302 (Ill. 1925).
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Simeon Baldwin, one of the founders of the ABA, observed:, “The new code of the
American Bar Association makes no such appeals to motives of expediency and selfadvantage. It occupies a higher plane . . . the good of the republic is looked at, not
that of the individual ”47 According to Charles Wolfram, the Canons “insisted that a
lawyer pursue the high road in every endeavor mentioned.”48 To that end, the
Preamble outlines the scope of the attorney’s role. For the ABA, the Canons were a
public declaration of the legal profession’s commitment to the rule of law and its
importance to society. The ABA reminded the profession that the stability of justice
“rests upon the approval of the people.”49 The public’s trust in the administration of
law “cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of
our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.”50 Accordingly, the
welfare of society rested on the ethical conduct of attorneys. The Code’s provisions
reinforced this ideology. Many provisions explicitly connected the specified conduct
to the interests of justice and the legal system.51 Others simply set forth general
platitudes for attorneys to adhere, such as civility, respect, candor, punctuality,
expedition, and fairness.52 In the final catchall Canon, the ABA summarized that
through adherence to ethical commands “a lawyer will find his highest honor in a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man
and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”53
The Canon’s republican character fashioned two client types to which an attorney
was bound.54 At the immediate level, attorneys zealously represent the party who
retains them. More abstractly, attorneys serve the collective, which we might think
of as the meta-client. Even in the private sphere, when not in the service of a client,
attorneys represent the meta-client. The well-being of the meta-client acts as a moral
compass directing attorneys in their personal and professional affairs. In this way,
what is good for the collective defines the lawyer’s ethical action on behalf of the
individual client. By grounding ethical conduct in a higher purpose, attorneys would
presumably act, not from self-interest or a fear of punitive threat, but in a kind of
stewardship to safeguard society.
The Canons were based on the Alabama State Bar Association Code of Ethics of
1887—the first code of legal ethics.55 The Preamble to the Alabama Code evinces a
similar republican tone: “The purity and efficiency of judicial administration . . .
47.

Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 541, 542 (1908).

48. Wolfram, supra note 21 at 54.
49. Code of Prof’l Ethics pmbl. (1908).
50. Id.
51.

See, e.g., id. at Canons 1, 5, 15, 20, 28, 29, 30, 32.

52.

See, e.g., id. at Canons 1, 3, 21, 22, 24.

53.

Id. at Canon 32.

54. See generally ABA Comm. on Code of Prof ’l Ethics, Final Report (1908).
55.

Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preface (1969).
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[d]epends as much upon the character, conduct, and demeanor of attorneys in this
great trust, as upon the fidelity and learning of courts, or the honesty and intelligence
of juries.”56 The Code was rooted in the work of David Hoffman and Judge George
Sharswood,57 both of whom worried about the precarious position of the lawyer,
namely, the danger of the steward’s proximity to the contagion of moral and social
corruption. In his 1836 treatise, Hoffman asserted that the profession “brings its
ministers into a too intimate and dangerous acquaintance with man’s depravity; it places
them in the midst of temptations; and whilst engaged in rescuing others, they sometimes
fall the only lamented victims.”58 Attorneys needed to conduct themselves ethically
because “any known departure from this excites more than ordinary distrust . . .
Character, therefore, and the best of manners are to the lawyer invaluable.”59 In his
1860 essay, Sharswood similarly warned: “[T]here are pitfalls and man-traps at every
step, and the mere youth . . . needs often the prudence and self-denial . . . which belong
commonly to riper years. High moral principle is his only safe guide; the only torch to
light his way amidst darkness and obstruction.”60 Despite their shared views of
corruption as contagion, the two men differed radically about what constituted the
lawyer’s principal allegiance, his or her sworn duty. Hoffman instructed attorneys to
act “with an eye solely to his country’s good.”61 According to Allison Marston, on the
other hand, Sharswood separated “the moral responsibility of lawyers from that of
society at large,” attaching it instead “to the client’s interests.”62 This fundamental
question—a recurring dilemma—about whether the lawyer’s primary duty was to
society, and thus, more abstractly, to the law, or to the client, redounds throughout
the history of the profession.
C. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility

The Canons survived largely unchanged until 1969, when the ABA enacted the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a code that modernized and ultimately
superseded the Canons. The ABA Special Committee of Evaluation of Ethical
Standards concluded that the Canons “were not an effective teaching instrument” and
56. Ala. Code of Ethics pmbl. (1887).
57.

Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preface (1969).

58. David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 745 (Thomas, Cowperthait & Co. 2d Ed. 1846)

(1836).

59.

Id. at 747–48.

60. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics 1 (1860).
61.

Hoffman, supra note 58, at 751.

62. Marston, supra note 21, at 495. Compare Sharswood, supra note 60, at 27 (“The lawyer, who refuses his

professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions
of both judge and jury.”) with Hoffman, supra note 58 (persons “who have violated the laws . . . are
entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure and honorable professional; and
indeed, to no intervention beyond scouring to them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of
their cause, and the due application of the law; all that goes beyond this . . . is unprofessional.”) (emphasis
in original).
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“many [were] abounded with quaint expressions of the past.”63 Some provisions were
poorly organized and others overlapped with one another.64 They were also unsuitable
for attorneys whose practices spanned various settings in an increasingly regulated
industrialized and urbanized world, particularly with the rise of large-scale corporate
law firms and in-house counsel departments.65 According to Wolfram, the Canons had
assumed a homogeneous profession conformable to a common set of standards.66
The Code consists of three parts: 1) Canons, 2) Ethical Considerations, and 3)
Disciplinary Rules.67 The Canons in the Code are “statements of axiomatic norms”
intended to “embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations
and Disciplinary Rules are derived.”68 They are broad, aphoristic statements that
function as subject-headings. For example, Canon 7, under which the no-contact
rule is listed, states, “A lawyer . . . is to represent [a] client zealously within the
bounds of the law.”69 Similarly, the Ethical Considerations are intended to be strictly
“aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of
the profession should strive.” 70 They provide explanatory commentary and general
practice guideposts. The Disciplinary Rules, in contrast, are “mandatory” and “state
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action.” 71
With the Disciplinary Rules, the ABA transformed ethical oversight into positive
law.72 According to Hazard, “whereas the Canons and the Ethical Considerations
represented fraternal understandings that memorialized a shared group discourse,
the [Disciplinary Rules] functioned as a statute defining the legal contours of a
vocation.” 73 The result was a reduction in the moral tenor. An ethic is a general,
axiomatic statement of human conduct, which does not dissolve at the border of a
polity. But once conduct becomes memorialized as positive law, the moral
considerations of the actor become inconsequential; the underlying connective and
educative force of the ethic is muted or disposed. The legality of an action instead
63. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preface (1969).
64. See id.
65.

See Daly, supra note 21, at 1127–28; see also Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preface (1969)
(One reason for the amendment was the “changed and changing conditions in our legal system and
urbanized society required new statements of professional principles.”).

66. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 54.
67.

Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Canon 7 (1969).
71.

Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969).

72. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “positive law” as “law promulgated and implemented within a particular

political community by political superiors, as distinct from moral law or law existing in an ideal
community or in some nonpolitical community.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1200 (8th ed. 2004).

73. Hazard, supra note 21, at 1251.
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becomes central, narrowing the focus to the time, place, and circumstances of an
occurrence. Ironically, as the profession sought to reform itself, the positivist direction
of oversight threatened to diminish the collectivist vision in favor of self-interest (in
particular, eluding punitive penalties) as the incentive for ethical conduct.
The ABA, nonetheless, still peddled republican rhetoric. While entirely rewritten,
the Preamble echoed the logic and sentiments of the original Canon’s introduction.
According to the ABA, if the rule of law is central to a free and democratic society
then “[l]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of
society.” 74 As stewards of the polity, lawyers needed to command society’s respect
and confidence, which they garner from “the highest standards of ethical conduct.”75
The Preamble reminds attorneys that because the Code merely provides minimum
directives of conduct, they must also consult their consciences as though the
understanding of ethics and morality were universal and the conscience had some
access to that truth beyond the experiences of the individual.76
Yet differences emerge. One important divergence between the two Preambles is
that, for the first time, the Code emphasizes the punitive consequences of unethical
practices. It warns attorneys to act ethically to avoid professional repercussions,
whether official sanctions or community disapproval, making self-interest an
important component of ethical oversight.77 Conduct was no longer rooted solely in a
civic responsibility toward the polity as a result of positivism. The Code, therefore,
possessed a paradoxical framework. It simultaneously advanced aspirational goals
and obligatory commands; and it instructed attorneys to protect the social entity and
themselves equally. As a result, the Code was quickly regarded as ineffective.
D. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct

By the mid-1970s, the ABA determined that the Code needed a complete
structural overhaul.78 The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
resolved to adopt the “restatement” format and abandon the tripartite structure.79
The Commission concluded that the prior format frequently forced attorneys to sift
through numerous provisions to determine the correct course of conduct. 80
Additionally, the substantive effects of the Code’s Canons and Ethical Considerations
74.

Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility pmbl. (1969).

75. Id.
76. See id. (“Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstones against which to test the

extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.”).

77.

See id. (“[I]t is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of the
society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of
ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.”).

78. See Roger J. Kutak, Chairman, ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Prof’l Standards, Report to

the House of Delegates (1982), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/kutak_2-82.pdf.

79. See id.
80. See id.
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led to confusion, encouraging the Code’s uneven application.81 The broad statements
propounded by the Canons and Ethical Consideration failed to “provide reliable
guidance to a lawyer seeking to determine what the ethical standards of the profession
require in specific situations.”82 In fact, “[t]he breadth of the language of Canons
goes far beyond the scope of specific Disciplinary Rules with the result that a Canon’s
standard may infinitely extend application of Disciplinary Rules or impose an
independent standard apart from any Disciplinary Rule.”83 In some instances, courts
actually converted the aspirational goals into additional obligatory commands.84
Finally, in 1983, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.85 The Rules consisted of approximately fifty black-letter laws
each accompanied by an explanatory comments section.86 The new organization
“provides lawyers with rules in a convenient organization to which they can
comfortably turn for answers to questions of professional responsibility.”87 While the
ABA reduced the broad and indefinite language, it did not completely remove the
dualistic framework from oversight. The majority of the Rules were obligatory,
meaning that they sought to “define proper conduct for purposes of professional
discipline.”88 Yet, the Rules retained a number of “permissive” directives, leaving
attorneys some “discretion to exercise professional judgment.”89
With the restatement format, the ABA nonetheless still took a larger step toward
positive law and away from moral standards.90 Wolfram noted that the Rules made
“no effort to define or explore the moral dimensions of the law practice.”91 The Rules
merely maintain that they “do not . . . exhaust the moral and ethical considerations
that should inform lawyers.”92 The ABA removed much of the lofty, inspirational
republican rhetoric from the preamble replacing it with a list of thirteen
“Responsibilities” of lawyers that primarily focus on lawyers’ obligations at the
immediate level as professional representatives to others.93
81.

Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preface (1983).
86. Kutak, supra note 78.
87.

Id.

88. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Scope (1983).
89. Id.
90. See Daly, supra note 21, at 1123. Hazard has noted, “the Rules were rendered in statutory language . . . .

[T]he Rules affirmed that the standards of professional conduct were legal obligations and not merely
professional ones.” Hazard, supra note 21, at 1254.

91.

Wolfram, supra note 21, at 70.

92.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Scope (1983).

93.

See id. at pmbl.
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Specifically, the Responsibilities articulate that the basic principles underlying the
Rules “include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate
interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous
and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.”94 What republican
rhetoric remains is either subordinated to the official administrative tone of the
Responsibilities or remains as a kind of rhetorical garnish to the imperative tone of
official policy.95 By disconnecting ethical oversight from its civic, moralistic mooring in
a presumed higher standard, an attorney’s ethical foundation consequently came to rest
exclusively on self-preservation.96 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in his well-known The
Path of the Law, predicated this potential effect of positivism. According to Holmes,
the difference between law and morality is that “[i]f you want to know the law and
nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.”97 Whether Holmes’ conclusion is accurate remains a scholarly
debate today—can morality with its epistemic limitations effectively govern a collective
group, or can positive law promote moral reflection beyond the legal text?98
II. A Brief History of the No-Contact Rule

A. The No-Contact Rule prior to the Canons of Professional Ethics

Despite the broader changes in ethical oversight since the nineteenth century, the
no-contact rule has remained largely static. In his 1837 treatise, Hoffman offered
one of the first statements of the rule in his list of ethical resolutions: “I will never
enter into any conversation with my opponent’s clients, relative to his claim or
defence, except with the consent, and in the presence of his counsel”—a fairly absolute
prohibition on any communication, leaving little, if any, room for an exception.99
Hoffman does not discuss the basis for the rule. His view regarding the need for
ethical resolutions, however, suggests that the rule serves to protect the public from
attorneys, who having been too long exposed to the corruptions around them, become
themselves corrupt. Professor John Leubsdorf located a less obligatory form of the
rule in an English authority from around the same time period:
94. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. (2002).
95. One passage reminds attorneys that among other roles, attorneys are “public citizen[s] having [a] special

responsibility for the quality of justice.” Id. Another passage with republican rhetoric is tucked away in
the last statement of the Preamble. Furthermore, the Preamble reminds attorneys that ethical conduct
must serve the public interest rather than the “parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar,” but this
statement seems present solely so that the bar may remain self-regulating. Id.

96. Daly, supra note 21, at 1123 (“The virtues of rules—predictability and stability—are thus transformed

into vices—excessive autonomy and alienated individualism.”).

97.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).

98. See supra note 21.
99. Hoffman, supra note 58, at 771 (emphasis omitted).
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Let your love of harmony lead you to recommend your clients to make greater
concessions, for the sake of tranquility, than rigid justice could require; and
even dare to sacrifice punctilio to concord, when you believe an interview
with the adverse party will be more conductive to the extinction of animosity,
the settlement of a dispute, and the renewal of good-will, than any negotiation
with his legal adviser.100

This construction, as Leubsdorf notes, created more of “a professional courtesy
than a binding tenet.”101
Despite Hoffman’s resolution, much of the nineteenth century is silent on the
subject. Sharswood never mentions it in his lectures.102 The no-contact rule eventually
resurfaces in the Alabama Code of Ethics of 1887: “An attorney should not attempt
to compromise with the opposite party, without notifying his client if practicable . . .
no[r] engage in discussion or arguments about the merits of the case with the opposite
party, without notice to his attorney.”103 The language here is more suggestive and
discretionary than the absolutist, moral tone of Hoffman’s resolution, affording
attorneys some room to engage in ex parte settlement discussions, particularly when
notifying opposing counsel is impractical or impossible. Prior to the Canons, a
number of state bar associations, such as Georgia and Maryland, adopted Alabama’s
version of the rule.104 There does not appear, though, to be any published case
employing the rule.
B. The No-Contact Rule From the Canons to the Model Rules

The ABA included the no-contact rule in the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics
under Canon 9, which stated:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should
not undertake to advise him as to the law.105

The Canon covered nearly all types of communications, expressly prohibiting
subject matter, settlement, misleading, and advisory communications with adverse
parties. But the provision is uninformative regarding organizational parties.
100. John Leubsdorf, Communicating with another Lawyer’s Client: the Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s Interests,

127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 683, 684 (1979) (quoting Letters From A.C. & W.H. Buckland, to an
Attorney’s Clerk, Containing Directions For His Studies and General Conduct 226
(1837)).

101. Id.
102. See Sharswood, supra note 60.
103. Alabama Code of Ethics (1887).
104. See Maryland Code of Ethics (1903); Georgia Code of Ethics (1889).
105. Code of Prof’l Ethics Canon 9 (1908).
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	Although the Canon offered little rationale for itself, shortly after its enactment,
Gleason L. Archer, dean and founder of Suffolk School of Law, provided an early
justification for the rule in his 1910 treatise, concentrating on the consequences of
improper communications.106 Such communications threatened to harm opposing
counsel because they “affront him personally and by implication [] affirm that he is
unworthy of his high profession.”107 An adverse party is endangered because he is
“not qualified to match his own imperfect knowledge of his rights against the
persuasion of his opponent’s lawyer, who is seeking the advantage for his client.”108
Attorneys damage their own reputation because “it is unprofessional, if not positively
dishonorable, to deal with an adversary behind the back of his lawyer.”109 Finally, the
profession suffers because once attorneys “show mutual disrespect and play mean,
underhanded tricks upon each other, just so soon do they lose standing in the
community and become the objects of contempt and reproach.”110 These rationales
would compose the overarching justification of the rule under later amendments.111
In 1969, the ABA superseded Canon 9 with Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (DR 7-104)
of the Model Code, which stated:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not (1)
communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party.112

While the directive remained identical for all intents and purposes, the ABA did
remove the examples of communications in favor of simply precluding communications
related to the subject matter of the representation, which is relatively indefinite
language itself. Ethical Consideration 18, which corresponded with DR 7-104,
provided only a general purpose behind the rule and instructed an attorney who
speaks with an unrepresented person to refrain from giving legal advice.113 Other
than that, the Consideration provided no instructive guidance regarding the issue of
organizational parties.114

106. Gleason L. Archer, Ethical Obligations of the Lawyer 154–57 (Little, Brown & Co. 1910).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 156.
109. Id. at 157.
110. Id. at 156.
111. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2002) (“This Rule contributes to the proper

functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in
a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers.”).

112. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-104 (1969).
113. See id. at EC 7-18.
114. See id.
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The ABA next adopted Model Rule 4.2, which borrowed the language of its
predecessor nearly verbatim.115 The central difference was that the Comments
section, unlike Ethical Consideration 18, provided an explicit method for identifying
employee “parties.”116 Comment 4 defined an organizational “party” as including: 1)
managerial employees; 2) persons whose acts or omissions in connection with the
matter at issue may be imputed to the corporation for liability; or 3) persons whose
statements constitute admissions by the corporation.117 Courts did not enthusiastically
embrace the Comment 4 test. Instead, over the next decade, the bench devised an
array of approaches for identifying parties: the case-by-case balancing test, the
blanket ban, the alter-ego test, the speaking-agent test, the managing-agent test, the
control-group test, and the scope-of-employment test.118
In 2002, the ABA revised the Comments to Rule 4.2, redefining an organizational
party as:
[A] constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly
consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority
to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or
omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization
for purposes of civil or criminal liability.119

The new construction is particularly peculiar. Aside from the imputation
language, the added language—“obligate” and “constituent”—has little legal pedigree
for interpretation. Courts and rulemaking bodies have not utilized these terms in
substantive areas, let alone the disciplinary context, leaving courts and litigants with
very little in the way of material for interpretation.
	Absent from the revised Comment of Rule 4.2 is a category that focuses on the
general status of an employee, which the original Comment had addressed in the
“managerial” employee prong. The ABA deleted that prong because it had “been
criticized as vague and overly broad.”120 The focus on a constituent’s authority does
not replace the “managerial” prong, but it acts more like the third Niesig prong that
deems employees who implement the advice of counsel to be a party. The ABA also
115. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (1983).
116. Compare Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-18 (1969) with Model Rules of Prof’l

Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (1983).

117. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (1983).
118. See, e.g., Fair Auto. Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 128 Ill. App. 3d 763, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)

(control-group test); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash.2d 192, 200 (1984) (speaking-agent
test); Cagguila v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 653, 654–55 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (blanket ban); Morrison
v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 18 (D. Mass. 1989) (balancing test); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 75
Civ. 2232, 1981 WL 334, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1981) (managing-agent test); Niesig v. Team I, 76
N.Y.2d 363, 374 (1990) (alter-ego test).

119. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002). In the 2002 amendments, Comment 4 became

Comment 7 under Rule 4.2.

120. ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Report on the Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Reporter’s Explanation

of Changes, R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/10-85rem.pdf.
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removed from the Comment the prohibition on communications with anyone “whose
statement may constitute an admission” because it too was considered “broad and
potentially open-ended” and “ha[d] been read by some as prohibiting communication
with any person whose testimony would be admissible against the organization.”121
According to one federal district court, the new “obligate” prong replaced the
“admission” prong, which ideally limits the reach of the prong. The court correlated
an employee’s “authority to obligate” as a speaking-authority pursuant to the Second
Restatement of Agency, which maintains that an agent’s statements are admissible
evidence against a principal only if the agent is authorized to speak on behalf of the
principal,122 a scope much narrower than the vicarious admission rule under the
Federal Rules Evidence on which the admission prong was based. Even though a
majority of states have adopted the 2002 amendment,123 courts have only raised the
revised Comment to Rule 4.2 on a few occasions, providing little discussion.124
C. The No-Contact Rule in New York Prior to Niesig

The New York State Bar Association adopted the Canons in 1909,125 yet with the
exception of one case in 1930, neither it nor the New York courts referenced Canon
9 until the late-1960s. In three of the four cases published in the 1960s, the New
York appellate courts narrowly addressed attorneys who negotiated settlements
directly with individual parties.126 In the fourth case, a trial court used Canon 9,
among other grounds, as a basis to preclude a defendant’s insurer from contacting the
plaintiff ex parte.127 During that time, the New York State Bar Association’s ethics
opinions also focused on narrow issues unrelated to organizational parties.128 New
York federal courts, on the other hand, do not appear to have ever even mentioned
Canon 9 during the Canon period.
121. Id.
122. Mendez v. Hovensa, L.L.C, 49 V.I. 849, 861 (D.V.I. 2008).
123. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, State Adoption of Model Rules, http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (stating that “[t]o date, California is the only states [sic] that do not have
professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct).

124. See, e.g., Mendez, 49 V.I. at 859–60; Wasmer v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., No. 2:05-cv-0986,

2007 WL 593564, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2007); Paris v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 450 F. Supp. 2d
913, 915 (E.D. Ark. 2006); U.S. v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1066–67 (D. Mont. 2005).

125. See In re Connelly, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126, 129 (1st Dep’t 1963).
126. See In re O’Neil, 239 N.Y.S. 297, 298 (1st Dep’t 1930); In re Wilkes, 201 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (1st Dep’t

1960); In re Chopak¸202 N.Y.S.2d 46, 46 (1st Dep’t. 1960).

127. See Juskowitz v. Hahn, 289 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
128. See generally New York State Bar Ass‘n, Prof ’l Ethics Comm., Op. 47 (1967) (addressed whether a

plaintiff ’s attorney may communicate with defendant’s insurance carrier); New York State Bar Ass’n,
Prof ’l Ethics Comm. Op., 101 (1969) (addressed whether an attorney appointed a trustee in bankruptcy
may communicate directly with the bankrupt); New York State Bar Ass’n, Prof ’l Ethics Comm., Op.
101(a) (1969) (addressed whether an attorney trustee in a bankruptcy may serve the bankrupt with
formal orders and notices).

279

The Niesig and NLRA Union

Local New York bar associations, however, did apply Canon 9 to organizations.
In a 1942 ethics opinion, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (“New
York City Bar Association”) examined whether attorneys may interview employees
“as to the facts involved in the litigation.”129 The Association authorized blanket
permission to interview employees ex parte without specifying if permission turned
on the type of employees interviewed.130 Henry Drinker, a legal ethicist who served
as Chair of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, however, later claimed that
the Canon “probably precludes interviews of managing employees of a corporation
having authority to bind it.”131 In 1964, the New York County Bar Association,
reaching a different conclusion, stated in absolute terms that all current employees
are off-limits regardless of “whether such employees are in ministerial categories or
have the capacity to bind the corporate employer.”132 The opinion expressly excluded
only former employees from the disciplinary rule.133
	Not until 1970, when the New York Appellate Divisions adopted the Disciplinary
Rules of the Model Code, did DR 7-104 replace Canon 9.134 The Appellate Divisions
declined to adopt the Ethical Considerations, which was insignificant since Ethical
Consideration 18 provided no guidance regarding organizational parties.135 New
York State courts addressed the disciplinary rule, as with Canon 9, on few occasions
prior to Niesig. Primarily invoking DR 7-104 in disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys accused of either giving advice to an adverse individual party or soliciting a
settlement or information from a represented individual.136 Prior to Niesig, the
question of who constituted a “party” in the organizational context did not arise in
New York State courts.
	New York bar associations and federal courts did, however, address the
organizational issue under DR 7-104 on several occasions before Niesig, devising a
number of often conflicting approaches while also potentially providing an early
statement of the “alter-ego” test. In 1970, the New York State Bar Association examined
whether an attorney may communicate with an employee of a governmental entity,
holding conclusorily that “all communications concerning [the] matter must . . . be
129. Bar Ass’n of the City of New York, Op. 613 (1942).
130. See id.
131. Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 201 (Columbia Univ. Press 1953).
132. New York County Bar. Ass’n, Op. 528 (1964).
133. See id.
134. See New York State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Standards of Attorney Conduct, Proposed Rules of Prof ’l

Conduct (20 08), available at ht t p://w w w.nysba.org/A M / Template.cfm?Section=For_
Attorneys&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=15184.

135. See Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-18 (1983).
136. See, e.g., In re LaCava, 385 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (4th Dep’t 1976) (communicated with and secured

affidavit from individual party represented by counsel); In re Shapiro, 455 N.Y.S.2d 604, 604 (1st Dep’t
1982) (communicated a settlement offer with a represented individual); In re Blum, 525 N.Y.S.2d 107,
108–09 (4th Dep’t 1988) (communicated advice to an adverse party).
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made with the designated counsel.”137 In 1982, the New York City Bar Association
overturned its 1942 opinion.138 Examining the interests of both parties and the
objectives of the no-contact rule, the Association settled on the scope-of-employment
test, which prohibits interviews with employees “whose conduct or statements with
respect to matters within the scope of their employment could affect the corporation’s
legal rights or obligations.”139 In contrast and without explanation, the Nassau County
Bar Association had issued a blanket ban against interviewing employees ex parte
shortly before Niesig.140
In 1975, the Second Circuit became the first New York federal court to consider
the matter. In Ceramco v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, the defendant sought to disqualify
plaintiff ’s counsel for contacting an employee ex parte and asking questions to help
determine venue.141 Interestingly, the circuit court did not focus on the identity or
status of the employee contacted, but rather on the conduct of the attorney. Because the
attorney did not overreach or deceive the employee, the Second Circuit found no
violation. Six years later in Sobel v. Yeshiva University, a district court alternatively
considered the identity and position of the employees, this time, mid-level managerial
employees.142 The court permitted the interviews because the employees could not bind
their employer. In this case, the definition of the term “bind” extended from the section
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that designates officers, directors, and managing
agents as “parties” to speak on behalf of an organization at a deposition.143 The court
noted that “[t]he persons sought to be interviewed are those whose depositions could
not routinely be compelled.” Although the Sobel court did not acknowledge it, courts
typically use the managing-agent test to determine which employees fall within any of
the three categories for a deposition under the civil practice rules. The test is typically
“answered pragmatically and on a fact-specific basis,” focusing on a number of factors.144
In 1985, in Frey v. Department of Health and Humans Services, another federal district
court addressed the merits of interviewing high- and low-level employees. This time
the court determined that employees who “are the ‘alter-egos’ of the entity, that is,
those individuals who can bind it to a decision or settle controversies on its behalf,”
would be deemed parties.145 Holding that “the high level managerial employees who
participated in the decision not to promote plaintiff fall within that category,” the court
137. New York State Bar Ass‘n, Op. 160 (1970).
138. See New York State Bar Ass’n, Prof ’l Ethics Comm., Op. 80-46 (1980).
139. Id.
140. See Nassau County Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, Op. 2/89 (1989).
141. See 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975).
142. See No. 75 Civ. 2232, 1981 WL 334, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1981).
143. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), 32(a)(3).
144. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 06 Civ. 5377, 2007 WL 1771509, *2 (S.D.N.Y. June

18, 2007).

145. See Frey v. Dep’t of Health & Humans Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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sought to balance the interests of the parties when it came to lower-level employees.146
Two years later, another New York federal district court employed this “alter-ego” test
to low-level employees.147
	At the time of these latter two federal cases, the ABA had enacted Model Rule
4.2, but the New York federal courts did not address the provision and its corresponding
Comment until 1990, shortly before Niesig. In Polycast Technology v. Uniroyal, Inc., the
district court examined whether DR 7-104 or Rule 4.2 governed the dispute, since
federal courts are not bound to follow the ethical directives of their host state.148 The
court adopted the former directive, yet acknowledged that “[t]his does not mean,
however, that this Court is bound by state court interpretations of the Code.”149
Accordingly, in holding that former employees were not parties, the court looked to
Comment 4, in addition to policy considerations and out-of-state case law. Subsequent
New York federal courts, however, have continued to use the case-by-case balancingof-interests test.150 Yet others courts have citied the Niesig and the Comment 4 tests
simultaneously, as though they supplemented each another,151 even though Niesig flatly
rejected the Comment 4 test.152 Finally, in 1990, the Court of Appeals announced its
three prong alter-ego test in Niesig. Consisting of a binding prong, an imputation
prong, and advice of counsel prong, all premised on agency and evidence law, the alterego test was a rejection of nearly every approach that preceded it since the New York
City Bar Association first gave permission for all interviews in 1942. Nonetheless, the
history of the no-contact rule in New York does not end here.
For the longest time, New York State remained the only state to hang onto the
Model Code, while others adopted the Model Rules or some variation of it.153 Having
considered adopting the Model Rules in 1985, the New York State Bar Association
was eventually overruled by the NYSBA House of Delegates.154 Soon after the ABA’s
2002 amendments to the Model Rules, the New York State Bar Association
146. Id.
147. McKitty v. Bd. of Educ., No. 86 Civ. 3176, 1987 WL 28791, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1987).
148. 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
149. Id.
150. Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 85 Civ. 7548, 1990 WL 267421, at *3–6

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990); Suggs v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 2774, 1990 WL 182314, at
*3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1990). For example, constitutional or discrimination claims will weigh heavily
in plaintiff ’s favor.

151. See Pauling v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Interior, No 95 Civ. 8408, 1997 WL 661393, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22,

1997); Miano v. AC & R Adver., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68, 76–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

152. See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 375 (1990) (“[W]e make clear that the definition of ‘party’ we adopt

for the purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) is not derived from the Official Comment to ABA Model rule 4.2.”).

153. American Bar Association, Dates of Adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, http://

www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chron_states.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).

154. See New York State Bar Ass’n, Proposed Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Introduction vi (2008),

available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=For_Attorneys&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=15184.

282

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct (COSAC) proposed the adoption of
the Rules.155 According to COSAC, the revised Comment to Rule 4.2 is “consistent
with the decision of the Court of Appeals in Niesig.”156 But this is merely the
Committee’s opinion—the Committee provides no explanation or support to back up
its conclusion. Both tests presumably intimate different standards. As previously noted,
a federal court had already equated the term “obligate” with the speaking-authority
test, which Niesig did not completely embrace by itself.157 Rather, Niesig’s binding prong
potentially casts a wider net, focusing on the authority to bind with conduct or words.
	Regardless, in 2007, the NYSBA House of Delegates adopted COSAC’s
suggestions, and, in February 2008, the NYSBA submitted a resolution to the
Appellate Divisions requesting they adopt the Rules.158 On December 16, 2008, the
Appellate Divisions ultimately approved the Model Rules, authorizing them to take
effect on April 1, 2009.159 The Divisions surprisingly did not adopt the Comment
sections to the Rules that the NYSBA had recommended.160 Absent the Comments,
the no-contact rule remains largely unchanged under Rule 4.2. Unless the Appellate
Divisions adopt the Comments, the Court of Appeals appears unlikely to disturb the
alter-ego test. Since Niesig, the court has only revisited the test on one occasion. In
2007, in Muriel Siebert Co. v. Intuit, Inc.—decided 17 years after Niesig—the high
court affirmed that former employees are not parties.161 The Court of Appeals’
reluctance to reevaluate the test, however, in no way precludes New York federal
courts from revisiting their approach.
III. The Composition of Disciplinary Rules

Underlying the debate about what type of professional self-governing system to
implement is the following question: what is the best way to compose ethical
directives? Since the Canons, ethical directives have shifted from broader to narrower
compositions. One motive for rejecting the Canons was that they “were not cast in
155. See Resolution Adopted Nov. 5, 2005 to Govern the Consideration of the Report of the

Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct, available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=2839.

156. Staff Memorandum from the New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Standards of Attorney Conduct

House of Delegates 328 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu38/
CommitteeonStandardsofAttorneyConductHome/COSAC_January_2007_House_Meeting.pdf.

157. See Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 375 n.5. In footnote five, the court cites to a number of cases and bar associations

that have promulgated a “similar test.” However, those tests are not as similar to the Niesig’s test as the
Court of Appeals might have wished. For example, in Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash.2d 192,
200 (1984), the court adopted the speaking-agent test, which Niesig never fully adopted. Also, in
Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) the court adopted the Comment 4 test.

158. See New York State Bar Ass’n Proposed Rules of Prof’l Conduct, supra note 154.
159. Press Release, New York State Unified Court System, New Attorney Rules for Professional Conduct

Announced (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/pr2008_7.shtml.

160. See id. The new Rules of Professional Conduct will replace the disciplinary rules of N.Y. Comp. Codes

R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200 (1990). Id.

161. 836 N.Y.S.2d 527 (2007).
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language designed for disciplinary enforcement.”162 Wolfram, for instance, noted that
the “wording [was] too vague and general to afford guidance.”163 In a 1908 letter
from Judge Francis C. Lowell of the First Circuit to Ezra Thayer, a member of the
committee that prepared the Canons, Lowell criticized the proposed Canons’
language and form as improper for guiding professional conduct.164 He remarked:
The object of the Code is to provide rules of practice, not by way of a sermon
with a homiletic purpose, but by way of ordinances which shall tell all lawyers
what they may do professionally and what they are forbidden to do. The
Code, as I understand it, like any other body of rules, is not intended primarily
to foster indefinite aspirations for virtue, but to regulate the ordinary affairs
of the professional life.”165

According to Judge Lowell, attorneys needed “accurate and concise” directives.166
Later, as the ABA changed to the Rules, the Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards emphasized that the “value of standards of ethical conduct to
the individual lawyer who seeks to practice in professionally responsible ways lies in
their definiteness.”167 In scope, the “rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.”168
Standards with “sweeping” language fail to provide attorneys with “fair limitation or
fair warning.”169 As one federal district court noted in 1990, the “importance of
providing attorneys with concrete ethical guidelines cannot be underestimated
[because] [t]he disciplinary rules often carry the threat of possible sanctions against
attorneys for ethical violations.”170
The very naming of the ABA’s major amendments has also signaled the move
toward a more definite and clearer compositional structure of directives. The term
“canon” denotes a moralistic, fundamental standard,171 while a “rule” is legalistic in
nature without explicit regard for moral axioms. A rule principally concerns itself
with what an actor may or may not do.172 A rule relies on punitive measures, executed
162. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preface (1969).
163. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 55.
164. See Letter from Judge Francis C. Lowell to Ezra Thayer 1 (June 12, 1908) (on file with the Harvard

Law School Library).

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Kutak, supra note 78.
168. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. and Scope (2007).
169. Kutak, supra note 78.
170. Siguel v. Trs. of Tufts College, No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990).
171. See Oxford English Dictionary Vol. 11 838 (2d. Ed. 1989) (A Canon is “a general rule, fundamental

principle, aphorism, or axiom governing the systematic or scientific treatment of a subject.”).

172. See Daly, supra note 21, at 1123 (“From the actors’ perspective, rules are usually perceived as more

conduct-specific than standards.”).

284

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

by an external adjudicating body, to ensure compliance, while a canon relies on the
actor to reform independently. Circumventing a canon does not trigger punitive
action, but relies on self-evaluation to instill a sense of ethical obligation and
professionalism.173 As a result, the composition of a canon differs significantly from
that of a rule. Ideally, the former has no compositional limits, while the latter
necessitates specificity, namely, notice of required conduct.
Wolfram has criticized the “unnecessary breadth” in ethical oversight for failing
to notify attorneys explicitly what conduct will give rise to sanctions.174 At the core of
his criticism, he appeals to the void for vagueness doctrine, which articulates that the
“basic principle of due process” means that “an enactment is void . . . if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined.”175 Justice Thurgood Marshall expounded upon the doctrine,
asserting: “[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.”176 Adjudicative bodies should
not employ a rule that fails to give individuals notice of the proscribed conduct and
then deprive the individuals of their livelihood, especially when the client’s interests
compel an attorney to advocate zealously.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to annul disciplinary directives as too
vague. A disciplinary provision frequently scrutinized as open-ended is DR 1-102(A)
(5), which states that a lawyer shall not “engage in any other conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.”177 Courts have upheld the directive on the
basis that attorneys know or should know those actions that diminish their fitness.178
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the guiding principle in determining
vague directives is “whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its
ethical strictures, would have notice of what conduct is proscribed.”179 A New York
appellate court added that DR 1-102(A)(5) “does not exist in a vacuum. It must be
read in conjunction with the other Disciplinary Rules and the ethical strictures of
173. See id. Daly has noted that “[s]tandards are less determinative than rules because they serve to promote

the advancement of abstract ideals such as goodness and fairness. From the decisionmaker’s perspective,
standards are both a blessing and a burden; a blessing because they encourage and legitimize nuanced
resolutions, a burden because they demand careful and honest reflection.”). Id.

174. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 87 (“Unecessary breadth is to be regretted in professional rules that can be

used to deprive a person of his or her means of livelihood through sanctions that are universally regarded
as stigmatizing.”). Moreover, Wolfram has disapprovingly referred to certain directives as “garbage cans
of the Code . . . into which anything can be tossed.” Id. at n.50.

175. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
176. Id.
177. Model Code of Prof’l Conduct DR 1-102(A)(6) (1969).
178. In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 190–91 (1991); In re Cohen, 530 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (1st Dep’t 1988);

In re Discipline of an Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 668–69 (Mass. 2004); In re Holley, 729 N.Y.S.2d 128,
132 (1st Dep’t 2001).

179. In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 191.

285

The Niesig and NLRA Union

the Code of Professional Responsibility.”180 The trouble with the reasonable-attorney
standard is that it requires a case-by-case factual analysis and attorneys to memorize
the Code—an ineffective method for regulating professional conduct, particularly
because it could lead to counter-productively cautious client advocacy.
	Accordingly, when punitive sanctions attach to disciplinary directives, their
semantic construction should be broadly, if not universally, operational. Operational
directives are ready-made; once the drafter sets down his or her pen, the directives
should contain the necessary language to function in real-life situations. In other
words, the author’s selected language should effectively communicate the proper
scope of conduct across time, place, and circumstances. Directives are operational if
they are instrumental, meaning that the language used is mechanistic and universally
applicable—requiring no interpretation, only reference. The selected language,
therefore, should be narrow, concise, and understandable to its audience. Standards
such as the Canons, on the other hand, are too conceptual, inciting reflection and
interpretation.181 They may be cast in broad language, otherwise ineffective for
regulations with punitive consequences. If drafters fail to devise an operational
directive, they leave the burden on the courts to implement the necessary
instrumentalities, which are typically expressed in the form of tests. The resultant
tests then should also function mechanistically.
Interestingly, Hoffman stated that ethical directives should be “frame[ed] [] in
the manner of resolutions, rather than of didactic rules, hoping they may thereby
prove more impressive, and be the more likely to be remembered.”182 He specifically
focused on the form of the directive rather than the specified conduct. Nearly all of
his resolutions begin with the pledge: “I will . . . .”183 The ensuing conduct of each
pledge is broadly defined and moralizing in tone.184 For example, Resolution 1 states:
“I will never permit professional zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and
decorum,” and Resolution 2 states: “I will espouse no man’s cause out of envy, hatred
or malice, towards his antagonist.”185
Granted, Hoffman’s suggestion to frame ethical directives as resolutions only
concentrated on the composition of the pledge, rather than conduct. Extending
Hoffman’s compositional suggestion to the conduct of a directive rather than just to
the pledge, however, informs how the conduct of contemporary ethical directives
should be composed. Consider that resolutions serve to incorporate and bind parties
to a resolved statement. Didactic rules, on the other hand, are aphoristic; they express
a general truth or wise observation without a binding effect. Didactic rules resemble
the early Canons, possessing a generalized meaning and moralistic tone that would
180. In re Cohen, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
181. Daly, supra note 21, at 1123.
182. Hoffman, supra note 58, at 751 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 752–75.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 752.
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require attorneys to engage in repeated, intensive reading, whereas resolutions would
require attorneys to engage in more extensive reading, viz. the collection of resolved
statements opposed to their dissection. Because a resolution serves to bind a collective
to a specific course of conduct, it should ideally be narrowly devised. Otherwise,
members of the collective will more likely breach the parameters of the resolution.
Disciplinary Rule 7-104 was not composed properly because the term “party” in
the organizational context is open to too many interpretations. The responsibility
then falls to the courts to mend the problem and provide attorneys with advance
notice of the appropriate limits of conduct. In order to do that, courts should forge a
rule, interpretation, or test that effectively communicates a singular, comprehensible
denotation of the term “party.” In Niesig, the Court of Appeals, however, constructed
an ineffective test that threatens attorneys’ ability to protect their livelihood and
advocate zealously.
IV.	The Shortcomings of Niesig

In Niesig, the plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured when he fell from a
scaffold at a construction site.186 Following commencement of an action against his
employer, the plaintiff sought judicial approval to conduct ex parte interview of lowlevel employee witnesses present at the time of the accident.187 In fashioning the
alter-ego test, the Court of Appeals rejected the control-group test and blanket
prohibition on such communications.188 The control-group test defined “party” to
include only the most senior management exercising substantial control over the
corporation, which left the majority of the workforce susceptible to informal
interviews.189 At the other end of the spectrum, the blanket ban on such interviews,
which the Appellate Division had endorsed,190 classified all current employees as
parties. While both of these extremes advance greater predictability in application,
they each left one party at a disadvantage. Attempting to strike a balance between
both, the court settled on the middle-road, three-prong alter-ego test.
Ironically, the Court of Appeals predicted that the alter-ego test would “become
relatively clear in application” because “[i]t is rooted in developed concepts of the law
of evidence and the law of agency, thereby minimizing the uncertainty facing lawyers
about to embark on employee interviews.” 191 This prophecy, however, has not
materialized. State and federal courts in New York State have barely, if ever, raised or
utilized the commands of agency and evidence law in their analysis.192 The Niesig
186. Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 368 (1990).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 371.
189. See id. at 373.
190. See id. at 372.
191. Id. at 375.
192. See, e.g., Miano v. AC & R Adver., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding an executive assistant

was not a “party” under the no-contact rule because he did not hold a management level position and his

287

The Niesig and NLRA Union

court in fact never administered the alter-ego test against the employees at issue, but
conclusorily permitted the interviews based on their low status.193 Subsequent New
York case law has almost exclusively addressed low-level and former employees,
holding, with little explanation, that they are not “parties.”194 In fact, the conclusions
insinuate that low-level employees are invariably unable to bind a principal, thus
completely disregarding local agency and evidence laws.
Mechum v. Outdoor World Corp195 and Gilbert v. State of New York,196 virtually the
only cases to address whether a supervisor is a party, both illustrate the failure to
utilize agency and evidence laws.197 In Mechum, the plaintiff, with the assistance of
counsel, tape-recorded a conversation with a supervisor employed by the defendant.198
The trial court noted that the plaintiff sought to gain an admission that “would have
to come from one with authority to speak for or bind the corporation.”199 Without
explanation, the court summarily found that while the employee was not senior
management, “supervisors have significant managerial responsibility, sufficient to
preclude ex parte communications.”200 While the summary conclusion suggests that
supervisors should be deemed parties based solely on their status, 201 no court has
affirmatively adopted Mechum. In fact, just a year after the decision, in Gilbert, the
trial court tacitly rejected the proposition of Mechum, but similarly failed to isolate
statements could not be imputed to the corporation). In Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F.
Supp.2d 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court held that the sales clerks were not parties because they were
“low-level employees with no management responsibilities whatsoever. As a result, they would generally
not be considered parties under DR 7-104(a) because they have no apparent or actual authority to bind
the company.” Id. at 125. That is not necessarily accurate under agency law; while a low-level employee
typically has little authority to bind, he or she is not without binding authority simply based on hierarchal
status, just as a higher-level employee does not necessarily have power to bind a principal on that fact
alone. In Merrill v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 1371, 2005 WL 2923520, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2005), the court held that a police officer was not a party because he “was not in a position to bind the
City, much less the other defendants in this case, in recounting what he observed at a police
demonstration.” In Albany Med. Ctr. v. U.S., 04 Civ. 1399, 2006 WL 4573714, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17,
2006), the court held that former employees could be interviewed. In Pauling v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of
Interior, No 95 Civ. 8408, 1997 WL 661393, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997), the court held with little
analysis that the employee was not a party. In Quintana v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (2d
Dep’t 1999), the court held that the superintendent was a low-level employee.
193. See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 374–76 (1990).
194. See cases cited, supra note 13.
195. 654 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1996).
196. 662 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997).
197. Schmidt v. State, 695 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1999), is a third case that addresses the identity of

supervisors. The court held that the supervisor was a party because the supervisor’s conduct may impute
liability onto the State. Id. at 229. The binding and imputation prongs differ in that the binding prong
is based on an employee’s authority while the other is based on vicarious liability.

198. 654 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
199. Id. at 247.
200. Id.
201. Mechum addressed other issues associated with DR 7-104, to which other courts have cited. See id.
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how the principles of agency and evidence instructed its analysis of whether a
supervisor was able to bind. There, the claimants sued the State for creating the icy
road conditions that caused an automobile accident. 202 During discovery, their
attorney interviewed a state supervisor ex parte who witnessed the condition of the
road and the State’s snow removal efforts. 203 The State sought to exclude the
supervisor’s statements under the no-contact rule, on the basis that the supervisor
possessed significant powers to bind, such as authority to direct personnel, make
field decisions, and file disciplinary complaints against employees. 204 Even though
the court explicitly stated that the issue rested on the employee’s ability to bind, it
went ahead and employed the imputation prong, holding that the supervisor could
not subject the State to liability because he was not responsible for the bypass on the
day of the accident. 205 The court left open whether or not the supervisor was
considered “indistinguishable” from, or could speak for, the State solely based on his
authority.
With respect to the binding prong, the doctrines of agency and evidence are
unable collectively to provide attorneys with prospective guidance as to whether or
not employees have the power to bind their employer. Each doctrine presents
complicated, fact intensive issues inappropriate for a mandatory disciplinary rule that
requires clear and functional instrumentalities. Aggravating matters, Niesig and its
progeny fail to supplement one another to build a normative jurisprudence that would
help guide attorneys and reduce judicial intervention.
A. Binding under New York Agency Law

Under New York law, employees may possess actual, implied, or apparent authority
to bind their principal. Actual authority is defined as “the power of the agent to do an
act or to conduct a transaction on account of the principal which . . . he is privileged to
do because of the principal’s manifestation to him.”206 Under implied authority, an
agent is empowered to bind a principal “when verbal or other acts by a principal
reasonably give the appearance of authority to the agent.”207 The problem with these
two types of authority is obvious: an attorney is forced to investigate what a principal’s
words or conduct could have been towards an alleged agent. Compounding the
problem, an agent may also obtain apparent authority when a “third party relied upon
the misrepresentations of [an] agent because of some misleading conduct on the part of
202. See Gilbert v. State, 662 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 992–93.
206. Dinaco, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc., 346 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2003); Wen Kroy Realty Co. v. Pub. Nat’l

Bank & Trust Co., 260 N.Y. 84, 91 (1932) (“Actual authority is the result of the principal’s consent
manifested to the agent.”).

207. 99 Commercial St. Inc. v. Goldberg, 811 F. Supp. 900, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Greene v. Hellman,

51 N.Y.2d 197, 204 (1980)).
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the principal.” 208 Apparent authority is created when “words or conduct of the
principal, communicated to a third party, [] give rise to the appearance and belief
that the agent possesses authority to enter into a transaction.” 209 This requires an
attorney to undertake the nearly insurmountable task of uncovering the tangled
relationships between an agent, principal, and third party.
Because every employee, regardless of hierarchal rank, may possess any one of
these three types of authority to bind the principal at some point, the legal problem is
exacerbated. This area of law is in fact often rife with litigation. Even more, a litigant
cannot establish any one of the agency authorities formulaically, for example, by relying
on titles alone. 210 Yet, neither the Court of Appeals nor New York’s lower courts have
attempted to more narrowly construe which of the three agency relationships should be
utilized and which disregarded, followed by how they should be applied.
B. Binding under New York Evidence Law

The Court of Appeals’ adoption of evidence law as a basis refers to the “speaking
agent” exception.211 Under New York law, an agent’s statements are generally not
binding upon his principal as an admission. The exception, however, maintains that
an agent may bind a principal to statements as though the employer itself stated them
when the statements are made (1) within the scope of the employee’s authority and
(2) during the course of the employee’s performance of his duties. 212 The central
issue typically focuses on the first element, which asks whether the employer
implicitly or explicitly authorized the employee to make statements. Explicit
authorization is simple enough: an employer instructs an employee to speak to the
media, for example. Implicit authorization primarily deals with the employee’s
responsibilities, i.e., was it a part of the employee’s job responsibilities to speak on
behalf of the entity?213 These types of employees typically consist of representatives

208. Ford v Unity Hosp., 32 N.Y.2d 464, 473 (1973).
209. Hallock v. New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 231 (1984).
210. The New York Court of Appeals and the State’s lower courts have held that an employee’s authority to

bind, whether in the form of actual or another type of authority, shall not be based merely on the
employee’s title. See, e.g., Wolf v. United Drug Co., 229 N.Y. 537, 538–39 (1920); Bruckner v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 657 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (3d Dep’t 1997); Studebaker Bros. Co. v. R.M. Rose
Co, 119 N.Y.S. 970, 972 (N.Y. City Ct. 1909).

211. See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 374 (1990) (“The potential unfair advantage of extracting

concessions and admissions from those who will bind the corporation is negated when employees with
‘speaking authority’ for the corporation . . . are deemed ‘parties.’”).

212. See Giandana v. Providence Rest Nursing Home, 815 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531 (1st Dep’t 2006); Kelly v.

Diesel Constr. Div., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 8 (1974); Niesig v. Team I, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (2d Dep’t 1989).

213. See Prado v. Onor Oscar, Inc., 353 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790 (2d Dep’t 1974); Jordan v. Excel Moving &

Storage, 800 N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 2005) (due to the nature of job
responsibilities, the general manager was in a position “to speak on behalf of the company with respect
to the company’s general procedures.”).
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who act in a spokesperson capacity,214 such as a company communications officer,
chief executive officer, public relations officer, or chair of the board.
	New York’s exception ironically favors the control-group test because normally
high-level management employees are those empowered to speak for the entity. 215
But the exception is not that simple. For example, under the exception, a supervisory
title alone will not automatically satisfy the element.216 Mid-level supervisors may
have no authority to speak on behalf of the entity, while low-level communications
supervisors may.
The appellate court in Niesig actually denounced the exception as a test because
it would likely expose all employees to ex parte interviews, 217 the complaint similarly
lodged against the control-group test. First, the appellate court observed that
corporate litigants represented by counsel would be unlikely, either explicitly or
implicitly, to authorize an employee to engage in ex parte interviews.218 Second, the
court was unable to fathom how ex parte interviews of employees “could ever be
viewed as having been made in the course of that employee’s actual duties,”219 though
a press relations officer or a chief executive officer might prove the rare exception. Of
course, the difference between the appellate court and the high court is that the
latter was not considering the exception as a test, but rather as a basis to satisfy its
alter-ego test, which raises multiple rhetorical questions: how should courts and
litigants use the evidentiary exception? Are bases employed differently than tests?
Are litigants expected to satisfy both elements in the same way they would if faced
with an evidentiary question? Did Niesig instead seek to employ the spirit of the
exception, meaning that those employees typically authorized to speak for the
employer would be deemed parties? The court’s endorsement of evidence, and agency
law for that matter, does not fully provide the answers.
C. Agency and Evidence Law in the Disciplinary Context

	Agency and evidence law predominately require a fact specific inquiry into the
relationships of persons. Without any clarification, if attorneys want to interview an
employee, these two doctrines require them to conduct discovery into and litigate
214. See, e.g., Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp.¸ 19 N.Y.2d 203, 206–07 (1967) (statement made

by “general foreman” shortly after plaintiff ’s accident was admissible because the foreman “whom
complete management responsibility for the enterprise was vest[ed,]” essentially, served as the company’s
“spokesman.”).

215. See id.
216. The vicarious admission issue frequently arises in premises liability actions where plaintiffs attempt to

impute knowledge via employee statements. See, e.g., Cohn v. Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc., 759 N.Y.S.2d
131, 132 (2d Dep’t 2003) (no evidence store manager authorized to speak on behalf of the employer);
Alvarez v. First Nat’l Supermarkets, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (2d Dep’t 2004) (same); Berzon v.
D’Agostino Supermarkets, Inc., 792 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (2d Dep’t 2005) (same).

217. See Niesig, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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whether or not the employer has empowered the employee to act or speak for the
entity. Attorneys should not be expected to engage in the sort of analysis with which
courts frequently struggle. Courts should explicitly identify how to apply bases,
particularly those as conceptual as agency and evidence bases, in the disciplinary
context. The courts’ failure to do so threatens to leave attorneys hopelessly mired in
agency and evidence law.
	Another concern is that under agency and evidence law, an agent’s ability to bind
a principal to a course of conduct or statement rests on whether authority is prescribed;
it generates an either-or analysis. The problem then is that employers may empower
employees to act or speak for the company in limited or broad circumstances, which
prevents drawing a clear line along the organizational hierarchy. In his lone
concurrence in Niesig, Judge Joseph Bellacosa worried that the alter-ego test would
swallow any exceptions, claiming it would “function almost identically with the
rejected [blanket ban] test.”220 One reason presumably is that all employees could
effectively fall within the binding-prong enclave. For that reason, the term “bind”
should be defined by the type of authority possessed, establishing a ceiling beyond
which attorneys could not pass.
In that regard, as Judge Bellacosa added, the “purpose [of the no-contact rule is]
quite distinct from enactments in public law prescribing the rights and protections of
parties to litigation.”221 He was pointing out that a test should satisfy the purposes
for which a rule was enacted. Agency and evidence law encompass a vast market of
public behavior suitable for respondent superior in tort law, for example, but unsuitable
for the disciplinary arena, which covers a specific population and sphere of conduct.
Historically, the no-contact rule was designed to protect parties from overreaching
attorneys extracting undue concessions, admissions, settlements, and privileged
communications that, in the organizational context, only those at the helm of an
entity, who truly are “indistinguishable” from it, typically have the power to make. A
test should then be narrowly tailored to identify those employees and, in doing so, it
will fulfill the rule’s purposes. The National Labor Relations Act “supervisor” test
should help do just that because its purpose is to define those employees who are
deemed one and the same as the entity.
V.	The National Labor Relations Act “Supervisor” Test

In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), informally
known as the Wagner Act, which sought to protect employees’ right to organize and
to reduce industrial unrest. 222 The Act forbids employers from interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights related to organizing,
forming, or joining a labor organization for collective-bargaining purposes. 223
220. Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 376 (1990) (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 377.
222. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
223. Id. at § 158(a) (2006).
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Initially, the Act did not expressly exclude supervisors from its protections. Under
the Act, “the term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,” an
exceptionally expansive (and circular) definition.224 Shortly after its enactment, the
unionization of supervisors became a fiercely contested issue. In 1942, the National
Labor Relations Board (“Board”) affirmatively held in a sequence of cases that
supervisors constituted “employees” and were entitled to the Act’s protections.225 The
Board reasoned that since supervisors were not included in the three enumerated
exclusions, Congress must have intended the Act to cover persons employed as
supervisors.226 A year later, the Board backtracked in Maryland Drydock Co., appearing
to overrule its prior position. 227 The Board quickly clarified itself in Packard Motor
Car Co., however, maintaining that supervisors were deemed employees, but that the
Board had discretion to deny them protections when it served the purposes of the
Act. 228 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Packard Motor Car Co. decision,
solidifying supervisors’ NLRA protections.229
The Court’s decision, however, received stinging criticism. It left the NLRA
without a clear distinction between “employees” and “employers.” In his Packard dissent,
Justice William Douglas stated: “The present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line
between management and labor” and “tends to emphasize that the basic opposing
forces in industry are not management and labor but the operating group . . . and the
stockholder.”230
In response, Congress enacted the Labor Relations Act in 1947, also referred to as
the Taft-Harley Act, which amended the NLRA, reversing the Court’s Packard
decision. The amended NLRA explicitly defined supervisors and excluded those so
defined from the protections of the Act. Under the Act, a supervisor includes any:
[I]ndividual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment. 231

224. Id. at § 152 (2006).
225. See Union Collieries Coal Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 165, 167 (1942); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874,

879 (1942).

226. See Union Collieries, 44 N.L.R.B. at 167–68.
227. See 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 737 (1943).
228. See 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 5–7 (1945).
229. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 485, 491–92 (1947).
230. Id. at 494 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
231. 29 U.S.C.§ 152(11) (2006). In Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., the U.S.

Supreme Court established the supervisory test to identity which employees are deemed statutory
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Because the statute is disjunctive, an employee need only possess authority to
execute one of the thirteen enumerated functions.232
	Although an alleged supervisor possesses a listed authority, the statute still requires
courts and litigants to focus on the quantity and quality of authority. “In determining
whether someone is a supervisor,” the Fifth Circuit has stated, “job titles [will] reveal
very little, if anything.”233 An employee must have power to exercise independent
judgment in performing the supervisory functions; otherwise the employee cannot be
deemed a supervisor.234 In other words, supervisors must have “real power” to act in the
interests of their employer.235 According to the Board, in order to exercise such power,
“an individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of the
control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing
data.”236 Employees who exercise independent judgment do not need to obtain approval
or permission from higher-ranked employees or follow the commands of superiors;
instead, they alone make employment decisions regarding the organization’s needs.237
Authority that is customary, sporadic, nominal, or “dictated or controlled by detailed
instructions,” will likely fall below the required threshold.238
Employees who have the autonomous power to hire and terminate other employees
are likely the easiest employees to label as a “supervisor” under the NLRA. Some
supervisors will, however, fall along an indeterminate position on the chain of
command, possessing certain degrees of power. The most common areas that the
case law examines are an alleged supervisor’s power to direct, assign, or discipline.
A. Power to Responsibly Direct

The power to responsibly direct focuses on two issues: first, supervisors’ power to
oversee how work is performed and, second, the potential repercussions they face for
performance issues. The first component is straightforward. It looks at whether the
supervisors. The Court instructed litigants to address three questions: 1) does the employee have the
authority to exercise at least one of the thirteen listed powers; 2) if so, does the employee exercise a listed
power using independent judgment; and 3) does the employee exercise the power in the interest of the
employer. 511 U.S. 571, 573–74 (1994).
232. See Superior Bakery, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 893 F.2d 493, 496 (2d. Cir. 1990); Nat’l Labor

Relations Bd. v. Sec. Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1967).

233. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. ADCO Elec. Inc., 6. F.3d 1110, 1117 (5th Cir. 1993).
234. See Sec. Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d at 147 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 148.
236. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 693 (2006).
237. See Superior Bakery, 893 F.2d at 496–97; Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Metro. Petrol. Co., 506 F.2d 616,

617–18 (1st Cir. 1974).

238. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 708; see also Sec. Guard Serv., 384 F.2d.at 147 (quoting S. Rep. No.

105, at 4 (1947) (The definition of supervisor is “distinguished between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up
men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such
genuine management prerogatives as to the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective
recommendations with respect to such action.”)).
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alleged supervisor has the power to instruct and correct how work is performed.239 If
alleged supervisors follow preset policies, work orders, or some other type of
instructions, their power will likely be deemed routine or clerical, not independent.240
The same goes for alleged supervisors who direct employees that “generally perform
the same job or repetitive tasks on a regular basis and, once trained in their positions,
require minimal guidance.”241 Moreover, simply being the highest-ranking employee
on site will not automatically create de facto directing power. 242
The responsibility component asks whether the alleged supervisor is “answerable
for the discharge of a duty or obligation.”243 Employees are deemed answerable when
they are “held fully accountable and responsible for the performance and work
product of the employees” they direct. 244 Accountability is established with proof
that “there is a prospect of adverse consequences for the putative supervisor if he/she
does not take [corrective] steps.”245 Being held accountable aligns the employee with
the employer; the employee’s decisions are made in the employer’s interests, not those
of the employees.246
The question simply boils down to whether the alleged supervisor is on the hook
for work problems. Evidence that employees are subject to discipline or unsatisfactory
evaluations for the performance of others is typically proof of accountability.247 For
example, an employer issues a written warning to an alleged supervisor because his
subordinates fail to meet production goals. 248 Material, adverse consequences,
however, should accompany evaluations or warnings; they are usually insufficient by
themselves.249
B. Power to Assign

The power to assign refers to employees’ authority to make immediate, autonomous
workforce decisions in connection with employers’ business needs. The focus is on
239. See Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 717, 721 (2006).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 722.
242. See Training School at Vineland and Commc’ns Workers of Am., 332 N.L.R.B. 1412, 1412 (2000)

(citing list of cases).

243. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 691 (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790

F.2d 1273, 1278 (5th Cir. 1986)).

244. Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 106 F.3d 484, 490–91 (2d Cir. 1997) (court

lists a number of legal and policy duties the employee will face consequences for if violated); Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd. v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2001) (shift supervisors reprimanded for
action of other employees and required to control certain situations).

245. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 692.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 695.
248. See Croft Metals, Inc. 348 N.L.R.B. 717, 722 (2006).
249. See Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. 348 N.L.R.B. 727, 730 (2006).
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what, where, and when work is performed, not on how it is performed.250 The Board
has defined “assign” as “the act of designating an employee to a place (such as a
location, department, or wing), appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or
overtime period), or giving significant overall duties. i.e., tasks, to an employee.”251
If employees are empowered to assign, they must still have significant discretion
to do so; their decisions may not be predetermined by the employer’s orders. 252
Employers who expressly command their “supervisory” employees or institute
instructive policies and procedures keep the independent decision-making power in
their hands.253 The Board has even stated that business decisions based on “preexisting
priorities—[like] a customer out of [a product]—or commonsense considerations—
[like] a sick driver must be replaced” are equally excluded from independence. 254
Furthermore, an assignment that results from an employee’s knowledge and skills
regarding issues incidental to performing job duties rather than the employee’s role as
an agent may not suffice. 255 If the assignment is solely based on “equalizing
workloads,” it too may be deemed routine and clerical.256 Finally, assigning workers
for overtime to meet routine overtime demands is also typically insufficient. Circuit
courts have warned, however, that established policies and procedures do not
automatically strip an employee of discretion.257 Employers may still empower alleged
supervisors to use significant discretion in making assignment decisions, despite
established policies.
C. Power to Discipline

The power to discipline asks whether an employee has authority to effectuate
consequences for a subordinate. There are a number of instances where alleged
250. See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 689 (“[C]hoosing the order in which the employee will perform

discrete tasks within those assignments . . . would not be indicative of exercising the authority to ‘assign.’”).

251. Id.
252. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 1324–25 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Nat’l

Labor Relations Bd. v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 675 F.2d 442, 444 (2d. Cir. 1982) (employees “collect[ed]
information so that others can make decisions, and routinely direct[ed] nontitled guards to do the jobs
others [had] assigned them.”); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Meenan Oil Co, 139 F.3d 311, 321 (2d Cir.
1998) (the dispatchers “decisionmaking is directed and circumscribed by clearly established Company
policy, and they exercise no authority that transcends the routine or clerical, or that requires the use of
independent judgment.”); Schnurmacher Nursing Home v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 214 F.3d 260,
266 (2d Cir. 2000) (nurse’s exercise of nominal discretion too little to establish assigning authority).

253. Meenan Oil Co, 139 F.3d at 321–22 (company established policies and procedures to instruct dispatcher

how to direct employees).

254. See B.P. Oil, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 1107, 1109 (1981).
255. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 8 Fed. App’x 111, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Nat’l

Labor Relations Bd. v. ADCO Elec. Inc., 6. F.3d 1110, 1117 (5th Cir. 1993)).

256. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 693.
257. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d 68, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2001) (including

itself, provides examples of cases).
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supervisors may appear to engage in disciplinary activities, but lack real authority.
Many employees may not make any judgments regarding a subordinate’s conduct,
but merely act as a “conduit for information” for the employer to take necessary
action. 258 For example, employees who informally counsel subordinates are not
necessarily labeled supervisors. 259 Employees unable to discipline other employees
without consulting higher management will not automatically create such status
either.260 Executing performance evaluations also does not necessarily fall within the
ambit of authority to discipline. An evaluation or other types of discipline that affects
a subordinate’s job status, such as termination, demotion, or promotion, should signal
that the employee is a supervisor.261
D. The Supervisor Test as the Basis for Niesig’s Binding Prong

The NLRA supervisor test is consistent with the goals of Niesig because it focuses
on the relationship between the employee and employer by identifying those
employees closely linked with the latter. At the same time, the supervisor test should
enhance the functionality of the binding prong, which the doctrines of agency and
evidence struggle to do. The major advantage of the supervisor test is that the
statutory language preempts the analysis by limiting it onto the thirteen enumerated
powers. This should have the effect of designating a clearer line along the
organizational hierarchy absent from the analysis under the current binding prong. If
an employee does not possess any of the thirteen powers, he or she is automatically
not a supervisor and thus should be available for ex parte interviews. Those employees
that do possess any of the enumerated powers are not necessarily untouchable. The
power must still consist of substantial quality and quantity. Because the focus is
solely on the enumerated powers—many of which may be relatively familiar and
recognizable to plaintiffs and their counsel, such as the power to hire and terminate—
attorneys do not have to go searching for every possible authorization bestowed upon
an employee. The breadth of case law on the NLRA supervisor test also should provide
attorneys with considerable guidance. As a result, the test should improve attorneys’
ability to prospectively identify which employees are able to “bind” the entity.

258. Meenan Oil Co, 139 F.3d at 321.
259. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d at 75 (employees who may informally counsel subordinates deemed

supervisors because they also had the authority to recommend discipline sanctions.). In Schnurmacher
Nursing Home v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., nurses counseled and disciplined staff members informally
and occasionally referred such issues to higher management, but the court did not deem such actions
and referrals as disciplinary authority. 214 F.3d 260, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2000).

260. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 8 Fed. App’x at 114.
261. See New York Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 156 F.3d 405, 414 (2d Cir.1998) (unit chiefs

required to evaluate attending physicians were instructed to give a grade range not deemed supervisors
on that basis.); Schnurmacher, 214 F.3d at 265 (nurses’ written evaluations of subordinates had no effect
on job status of subordinates).
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VI.	Procedural and Evidentiary Requirements for Conducting or
Precluding Ex Parte Interviews

A. Procedural Requirements

The Comment to Model Rule 4.2 advises: “A lawyer who is uncertain whether a
communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order.”262
This procedure disadvantages parties seeking interviews. It compels them to expend
time and expense requesting judicial approval, places on them the initial burden of
proof, and forces them to disclose their strategy, giving opposing counsel ample time
to confer with the witness, all of which further supports the need for improved
determinacy.
Despite the Comment, courts have not adopted an official, uniform procedure
for requesting or prohibiting ex parte interviews. Parties have pursued a number of
tactics. Employers have moved for protective orders to prevent plaintiff ’s counsel
from contacting their employees outside formal discovery methods.263 They have also
moved to exclude statements obtained through ex parte interviews and to disqualify
plaintiffs’ counsel for improper interviews. 264 Plaintiffs’ attorneys have moved for
declaratory orders and to “compel the defendants to desist from interfering with []
counsel’s efforts to communicate ex parte.”265 Two separate procedures may, however,
better balance the interests of all parties and establish uniformity: 1) undisclosed
contact, or 2) disclosed contact. While both procedures are devised with the
supervisor test and fact witnesses in mind, they can also be adapted to the other two
Niesig prongs.
		

1. Undisclosed Contact

	Attorneys may contact employees ex parte without notifying the employer and
pose initial introductory questions to ensure compliance with the no-contact rule. At
first, the attorney should question whether the employee has any of the thirteen
functions of authority listed in the NLRA supervisor test. If so, the attorney should
then vet the quantity and quality of the authority guided by common sense and case
law. For fact-witness employees, this type of questioning should not compel the
release of any information that the no-contact rule protects. This procedure allows
attorneys to gain information, while keeping their strategy hidden from defendants
and preserving time and expense from litigating the no-contact issue.
The method, however, presents obvious risks for disciplinary repercussions.
Attorneys might reach incorrect conclusions. Or employees might accidentally or

262. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002).
263. See, e.g., Frey v. Dep’t of Health & Humans Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Wright v. Stern,

No. 01 Civ. 4437, 2003 WL 23095571, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2003).

264. See, e.g., Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 506, 507–08 (2007).
265. See, e.g., McKitty v. Bd. of Educ., No. 86 Civ. 3176, 1987 WL 28791, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1987).
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intentionally disclose protected information. 266 Finally, attorneys might not resist
eliciting information from a potential wellspring of facts that sits before them when
they know the employee is likely a party.
		

2. Disclosed Contact

If attorneys are unsure whether an employee is a party, or are simply extra
cautious, they should provide opposing counsel with a five-day notice of their
intention to interview employees ex parte, which is not inconsistent with the deposition
and subpoena notice requirement under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 267
Upon receipt of a notice, opposing counsel may seek a protective order within a
limited five-day timeframe. 268 If declining to object, opposing counsel’s silence
should be deemed constructive consent, which would then protect attorneys from
disciplinary repercussions.
The procedural benefit is twofold. First, the burden shifts to employers to object
and offer prima facie evidence that the employee is a party (which is where the burden
should rest). Employers who seek unjustified protective orders solely to impede their
adversary’s prosecution may be liable for sanctions. Second, the brief window to
object ideally reduces the time employers have to taint the testimony of a witness.
Unfortunately, revealing legal strategy might be somewhat unavoidable with any
middle-road approach.
B. Evidentiary Burdens

Should an employer object to an ex parte interview, the employer should be
required to proffer sufficient proof that the employee is a party, since a party seeking
266. See, e.g., G-1 Holdings v. Baron & Budd, 199 F.R.D. 529, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“It is unrealistic to

expect even the best-intentioned lay person to be able to safeguard the attorney-client privilege.”).

267. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45; see also P.S. v. Farm, Inc. 2009 WL 483236, at *4

(D.Kan. Feb. 24, 2009) (five days notice deemed reasonable); CIF Licensing, LLC v. Agere Systems
Inc. 2009 WL 187823, at *2 (D.Del. Jan. 23, 2009) (seven days notice deemed reasonable); Jones v. U.S.
720 F.Supp. 355, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (eight days notice deemed reasonable). Some courts recognize
that service and notice of a subpoena may be performed simultaneously. See, e.g., Florida Media, Inc. v.
World Publications, LLC, 236 F.R.D. 693, 694–95 (M.D.Fla. 2006); Shell v. Hilliard, 2007 WL
509263, at *4 (E.D.Tenn. Feb. 13, 2007).

268. Courts have adopted procedures, which are similar to the disclosure procedure discussed here and are

instructive. See, e.g., Katt v. New York City Police Dep’t, No. 95 Civ. 8283, 1997 WL 394593, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1997) (the court instructed plaintiff to “serve a proposed list of the individuals she
intends to interview, which should include the proposed employee’s name and job title. Within ten (10)
days of the plaintiff ’s service of the list, defendants may serve and file their objections, if any, to the
employees plaintiff proposes. . . . [T]he Court, if the parties are unable to agree in writing, will direct
which employees may be interviewed.”); Wright, 2003 WL 23095571, at *1 (court directed plaintiff ’s
counsel to advise defense counsel in writing of the names and positions (if known) of the employees at
least seven days before the interviews); Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, LLP,
No. 03 Civ. 5560, 2006 WL 1520227, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) (party instructed to submit a list to
opposing counsel, who has ten days to submit an affidavit or declaration attesting that the witnesses had
access to privileged information).
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to restrict discovery of relevant material has the burden of persuasion.269 Since titles
alone are insufficient to deny a party the right to interview an employee ex parte, a
company cannot brand an employee with a decorative title of “supervisor” or
“manager” in an effort to transform the employee into a “party” under the no-contact
rule. Employers should produce admissible evidence, such as affidavits and documents
that show their employee has the power to bind. Courts should reject broad,
conclusory statements of authority—the NLRB has held as much in connection with
the supervisor test. 270 Additionally, courts may not rely solely on the self-serving
representations of an employer’s counsel regarding an employee’s authority. Both
state and federal courts in New York have held that absent personal knowledge,
counsel’s representations are not probative, and therefore, not admissible evidence.271
VII. Conclusion

The NLRA supervisor test’s enumerated functions, at a minimum, should set a
floor below which all employee fact-witnesses may be available for ex parte interviews,
something that agency and evidence law has failed to do. Both doctrines are too fact
intensive and difficult to effectively limit in the attorney disciplinary context. The
supervisor test, on the other hand, narrows the inquiry into specific forms of
authority, some of which are common sense. In many instances, plaintiffs should
know, for example, how to identify those employees with real power to hire,
terminate, or discipline. An established floor will ideally improve attorneys’ ability to
prospectively determine when fact witnesses are parties, which in turn will
simultaneously allow them to prosecute actions zealously and protect their
livelihood.
The NLRA supervisor test will not, however, magically resolve all the problems
with the binding prong—nothing short of a blanket ban or possibly the controlgroup test would. No doubt, attorneys would, in specific instances, still have to
expend time and expense litigating the issue, but that is a valid consequence of any
approach that attempts to resolve competing interests. The best courts can do in this
situation is to implement the clearest possible standard, which is vital for mandatory
disciplinary directives.
While judicial intervention may initially be necessary to identify the relevant
evidence an employer must present to establish the employee’s status as a party, the
development of a functional body of law would reduce the need for excessive
intervention. Employers will invariably know that empty, conclusory objections are
269. See Murray v. Palmer, No. 903 Civ. 1010, 2006 WL 2516485, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006).
270. Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. 348 N.L.R.B. 727, 731 (2006) (“The Board has long recognized

that purely conclusory evidence is not sufficient to establish supervisory status; instead, the Board
requires evidence that the employee actually possesses the Section 2(11) authority at issue.”).

271. See Pisani v. Westchester County Health Care Corp., No. 05 Civ. 7113, 2007 WL 107747, at *2–3

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2007) (without an affidavit from an affiant with personal knowledge, counsel’s
statements were deemed insufficient); Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 563 (1980) (“[T]he
bare affirmation of Royfost’s attorney who demonstrated no personal knowledge of the manner in
which the accident occurred . . . is without evidentiary value.”).
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inadequate responses to notices to interview, but instead will know that probative
evidence is required to establish an employee’s authority. Once the evidentiary line is
drawn, employers could not reasonably object to proper ex parte interviews (particularly
at the risk of sanctions), and attorneys should refrain from seeking improper
interviews. Moreover, because the courts are not constrained to use the test in
accordance with congressional intent or federal jurisprudence, they may amend it to
best suit the needs of the no-contact rule, such as making the supervisory functions
conjunctive opposed to disjunctive, adhering to circuit courts’ narrow interpretation
of “independent judgment,” or reducing the number of functions a “supervisor” may
possess.
The New York Court of Appeals and its lower courts should continually explore
revising the approach until the middle-road becomes as functional as possible. A
disciplinary rule that invokes sanctions on those it governs warrants clarity from its
rule-making and adjudicating branches to be useful. In the end, the latter branch is
responsible for mending any deficiencies that the former branch leaves. Adopting the
NLRA supervisor test as the determinant of propriety in ex parte interviews of
employee fact-witnesses would greatly advance that goal.
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